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INTRODUCTION
The reform goal of promoting reasonable consistency and reducing
disparity in sentencing is meaningless without a frame of reference—
consistency or disparity relative to what underlying principles?1 In order to
decide that two offenders are similarly situated and thus should receive similar
sentences (or that they are dissimilar and should receive different sentences) we
must first define the relevant sentencing factors (the offense and offender
characteristics that judges should consider in determining appropriate
sentences) and the weight to be given to each of these factors. The choice and
weighting of sentencing factors depends, in turn, on the punishment purposes
which the sentence is supposed to serve.
∗ Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota. I would
like to thank Kevin Reitz and Michael Tonry for their helpful comments on an earlier
version of this Article.
1. See Anthony N. Doob, The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines: If You
Don’t Know Where You Are Going, You Might Not Get There, in THE POLITICS OF
SENTENCING REFORM 199, 233-35 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995); Paul J. Hofer
& Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 36-37 (2003); Peter Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
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Sentences can serve many purposes, and these purposes are often in
conflict. Some of the most difficult conflicts are between proportionality
principles, on the one hand, and case-specific crime-control or restorativejustice purposes, on the other. Proportionality serves both retributive (just
deserts) and practical (utilitarian) sentencing purposes. Under a retributive
theory, sanctions should be scaled in proportion to each offender’s
blameworthiness, and equally culpable offenders should receive equally severe
sanctions. Sentencing proportionality and uniformity also have practical
benefits, such as reinforcing public views of relative crime seriousness and
maintaining public respect for criminal laws and the criminal justice system.
But realizing the goal of efficiently preventing future crime sometimes
requires unequal or disproportional treatment. For example, if two first-time
offenders commit the same crime but one has genuine feelings of remorse,
strong family ties, and other indications of amenability to supervision and low
risk of reoffending, putting that offender on probation and sending his much
riskier counterpart to prison saves scarce correctional resources while still
promoting public safety. But doing so produces disparate sentences for equally
culpable offenders and undercuts the practical values served by uniformity and
proportionality.
The best solution to conflicts such as this is not to adopt a narrow
punishment theory (e.g., one based solely on retributive or risk-management
goals), but rather to design a hybrid sentencing system that gives appropriate
scope to all legitimate sentencing purposes. The hybrid approach adopted by
most state guidelines systems is a version of the theory of limiting
retributivism. Under this approach, principles of uniformity and proportionality
relative to crime seriousness and offender desert set upper and lower limits on
sentencing severity. Within the range defined by these limits, other principles
provide the necessary fine-tuning of the sentence imposed in a particular case.
These other principles include not only traditional crime-control purposes such
as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but also a concept known as
parsimony—a preference for the least severe alternative that will achieve the
purposes of the sentence. The parsimony principle recognizes that severe
penalties are expensive and usually harmful to offenders and that the crimecontrol benefits of such penalties are uncertain and often quite limited. Severe
penalties should therefore be used as sparingly as possible.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of contemporary sentencing
purposes and discusses some of the many ways in which these purposes
conflict with each other. Part II describes the theory of limiting retributivism
and shows the widespread support that exists for this theory among sentencing
philosophers, in model codes and standards, and in contemporary sentencing
law and practice, particularly in state guidelines systems. Several illustrative
cases are used to show how limiting retributivism reconciles conflicting
punishment purposes. The Conclusion emphasizes the importance of clearly
defining and reconciling such purposes, both in designing a sentencing system
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and in deciding what sanctions are appropriate in a given case. It also offers
suggestions for how courts and Congress could reinforce the limiting
retributive elements which are implicit in the Federal Guidelines’ enabling
legislation.
I. OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY SENTENCING PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS
Unless criminal penalties serve valid purposes, they impose useless costs
and hardship. Even when the purposes are valid, punishment may be limited by
moral values or practical concerns. Punishment purposes are positive, justifying
principles; punishment limitations are negative, restraining principles. It is
important to clearly define these positive and negative principles and to guide
judges in their application.
In an indeterminate sentencing system,2 the legislature usually only
provides a very general, all-inclusive list of sentencing purposes and
limitations, giving little or no guidance to system actors (prosecutors, trial and
appellate judges, parole and other correctional officials) as to how these
principles should be defined and applied in specific cases. Some state
guidelines commissions have provided such definitions and guidance.3 The
United States Sentencing Commission chose not to,4 and federal trial and
appellate judges have not done so either.5 As a result, federal sentencing is no
more coherent and principled today than it was before the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were adopted. The overall structure and specific provisions of the
existing Guidelines lack any clear underlying or principled basis, and judges
called upon to interpret the Guidelines have thus been left to invoke whatever
purposes and limitations they prefer.
Why should violators of criminal laws be punished, and what principles
should be recognized to limit the type and degree of punishment?6 Punishment
purposes and limitations are traditionally grouped in two categories: utilitarian
and nonutilitarian. Utilitarian purposes and limitations seek to achieve
beneficial effects (or a net benefit) and, in particular, lower frequency and/or
seriousness of future criminal acts by this offender or others. Nonutilitarian

2. For further discussion of such systems, see infra text accompanying note 8.
3. See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 813, at 35 (1980).
4. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004); Doob, supra note 1, at 246;
see infra text accompanying notes 49-55 (discussing support for limiting retributivism in
guidelines statute). But see Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 1, at 51-52 (claiming that
modified just deserts theory, a form of limiting retributivism, is implicit in and provides the
most coherent explanation for the Federal Guidelines).
5. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 1 passim (finding scant theory in guidelines
case law).
6. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1282-94 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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punishment purposes and limitations embody principles of justice and fairness
which are viewed as ends in themselves, without regard to whether they
produce any particular social or individual benefit.
While these two major categories of punishment purposes and limitations
are conceptually separate, in practice they are often closely linked. As
discussed more fully below, although proportionality and uniformity in
sentencing are often claimed to be ends in themselves, each also has important
utilitarian value. Sentences which depart greatly from widely held views of
proportionality and uniformity may fail to prevent future crime and may even
encourage crime by undermining the public’s ability to gauge the relative
seriousness of crimes and by lessening respect for criminal laws and the
criminal justice system.
A. Utilitarian Purposes and Limitations
The most widely adopted utilitarian sentencing principles focus on using
criminal penalties to prevent or lessen the seriousness of future criminal acts by
the offender being sentenced and/or by other, would-be offenders. Criminal
penalties have the potential to achieve these crime-control effects through at
least five causal mechanisms: rehabilitation, incapacitation, specific
deterrence, general deterrence, and denunciation. Each of these methods
depends on certain critical assumptions and conditions for its effectiveness.
The first three methods seek to prevent future crimes by this particular
offender; these methods thus assume both that certain defendants have an
elevated risk of reoffending (justifying special measures addressed toward them
specifically) and that these offenders and their degree of elevated risk can be
identified in advance. Rehabilitation further assumes that the offender has
identifiable and treatable problems which cause him to commit crimes; this
approach seeks to reduce the offender’s future criminality by addressing those
causes through education and treatment in prison or in a nonprison program.
Incapacitation prevents crime by imprisoning high-risk offenders, thus
physically restraining them from committing further crimes against the public.
This crime-control method assumes not only that such offenders can be reliably
identified but also that they are not made worse by imprisonment, and that—
while in custody—they are not replaced by other offenders.7 Specific
deterrence (also known as special or individual deterrence) seeks to discourage
the defendant from committing further crimes by instilling fear of receiving the
same or a more severe penalty in the future.
Rehabilitation and incapacitation are the most important sentencing
purposes underlying traditional indeterminate sentencing systems.8 Judges are
7. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 146 (rev. ed. 1983).
8. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 4, 6 (1996); Steven L. Chanenson, The
Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 385-86 (2005); Richard S. Frase, The
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given very broad discretion to assess the degree of risk posed by the offender,
diagnose the causes of that risk, assess whether those causes can effectively and
safely be treated without incarceration, and, if they cannot, decide the
maximum and sometimes the minimum term of incarceration. Within the
maximum and any minimum prison term set by the judge, correctional officials
and parole boards are given very broad discretion to further assess the causes of
the offender’s criminality, the best treatment options available to address those
causes, and the precise moment at which, due to prison programming and/or
other factors (e.g., maturation or aging) the offender can be safely released. To
a lesser extent, indeterminate sentencing regimes also promote specific
deterrence. Sentencing judges can use their discretion to determine whether the
defendant poses an elevated risk of reoffending, and if so, what additional
punishment is needed to offset that risk.
Such highly discretionary determinations of risk, treatment needs, and
offender deterrability are very difficult to make reliably and consistently. For
this reason, indeterminate sentencing began to fall out of favor in the 1970s.9
Mounting evidence revealed that virtually identical offenders receive very
different sentences from different judges. Similarly, broad parole discretion fell
out of favor because of the different treatment given to similar offenders and
the inherent difficulty of assessing individualized risk and progress toward
reform on the basis of behavior in prison (some model prisoners behave much
worse in the community than they did in the highly controlled prison
environment; other offenders adapt poorly to the prison regimen but behave
much better when released).
The fourth and fifth crime-control methods, general deterrence and
denunciation, are designed to prevent future crimes by members of the public at
large or certain subgroups believed to have an elevated risk of offending.
General deterrence seeks to discourage would-be offenders from committing
further crimes by instilling a fear of receiving the penalty given to this
offender.10 General deterrent effects depend on a number of factors: the
severity of the penalty; the swiftness with which it is imposed; the probability
of being caught and punished; the target group’s perceptions of the severity,
swiftness, and certainty of punishment; the extent to which members of the
target group suffer from addiction, mental illness, or other conditions which
significantly diminish their capacity to obey the law; and the extent to which
these would-be offenders face competing pressures or incentives to commit
crime. As a result of the combined impact of these factors, some offenses and
offenders are likely to be easily deterred by the threat of criminal penalties; at
Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. 1, 7 (1993) [hereinafter Frase,
Uncertain Future].
9. See, e.g., AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); TONRY, supra
note 8, at 7, 9-10; Frase, Uncertain Future, supra note 8, at 7-9.
10. See FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT
IN CRIME CONTROL 72-73 (1973).
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the other extreme, some offenses and offenders are essentially undeterrable.
Several of the deterrence factors listed above interact. For example, a
major increase in penalty severity may cause a decrease in the swiftness and/or
certainty of punishment. This is because severe penalties give offenders a
stronger incentive to vigorously contest the charges and may make prosecutors,
judges, and juries reluctant to consistently impose such penalties. Research has
found that offenders are more sensitive to the probability of punishment than to
its severity.11 Thus, increased severity may cause crime rates to remain the
same or even increase.
Punishment can also prevent crime by means of more diffuse processes
that depend on internalized values rather than fear of punishment. Through
denunciation (also referred to as the communicative, educative, or expressive
function of punishment, or as positive general prevention) criminal penalties
serve to define and reinforce important social norms of law-abiding behavior
and relative crime seriousness.12 Such norms guide and restrain behavior even
when the chances of detection and punishment are slight. Given the many
difficulties of preventing crime by rehabilitation, incapacitation, or deterrent
threats, norm-reinforcement is probably the most important crime-preventive
effect of punishment (but also the most difficult to measure, since its effects are
so diffuse and long term).
In addition to crime control, sentences may achieve several other important
utilitarian purposes: promoting satisfaction, closure, and/or compensation for
crime victims and victimized communities; reassuring the public that
something is being done about crime; and facilitating the offender’s successful
reintegration into society. Each of these effects is desirable for its own sake but
may also help to prevent future crimes by the defendant or other would-be
offenders.
Utilitarian theory also imposes several important limitations on the form or
severity of punishment. Criminal penalties should not cost more than the
benefits they achieve or cause individual or social harms which outweigh their
crime-controlling effects or other benefits.13 Punishment should also be
efficient. Penalties should not be more severe or more costly than necessary; if
the same crime-control and other benefits can be achieved with less severe or

11. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE
SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 5, 47 (1999). The tradeoffs noted in text also
explain why, in practice, mandatory minimum penalties provide little crime benefit and
make sentencing outcomes less, not more, uniform. See TONRY, supra note 8, at 134-64.
12. See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1286-87; Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468-77 (1997).
13. See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the
Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 593-95
(2005) [hereinafter Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences] (discussing utilitarian ends
proportionality principle).
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less costly methods, those methods should be preferred.14 In a world of limited
resources, punishment must also be prioritized. Prison beds and other scarce
correctional resources should be reserved for the most socially harmful offenses
and offenders. Prisons must also not be used beyond their effective capacities.
Overcrowded prisons are unsafe for prisoners and staff, and reduced security
and resources for programming increase the odds that prisoners will leave
prison more violent or antisocial than when they entered. (Overcrowded prisons
are also likely to violate nonutilitarian principles, in particular the right to
humane treatment discussed below.)
B. Nonutilitarian Purposes and Limitations
Retribution is the most widely recognized nonutilitarian sentencing
principle. Under this theory, offenders should be punished in proportion to their
blameworthiness (or desert) in committing the crime being sentenced. Two
basic elements determine an offender’s degree of blameworthiness: the nature
and seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime and the
offender’s degree of culpability in committing the crime.15 Culpability depends
on several factors: the offender’s intent (deliberate wrongdoing is more
culpable than criminal negligence); his or her capacity to obey the law (which
may be diminished by mental disease or defect, chemical dependency, or
situational factors such as threats or other strong inducements to commit the
crime); the offender’s motives for committing the crime (which may mitigate
or aggravate culpability); and, for multi-defendant crimes, the defendant’s role
in the offense as instigator, leader, follower, primary actor, or minor player.
Retribution can serve both as a purpose (positive justification) for
punishment and as a limitation on penalties imposed to achieve other purposes.
The purpose theory views retribution as the primary or even exclusive goal of
punishment—offenders are punished simply because they deserve to be and the
severity of their punishment should be no more and no less than they deserve.
The underlying moral arguments supporting this view often involve claims of
fairness: fairness to the victim and the victim’s family (whose right to seek
vengeance is supplanted by the criminal law); fairness to law-abiding persons
(who refrained from committing this offense); and fairness to the defendant
(who, according to this theory, has a right to be punished in proportion to his
blameworthiness).
As discussed more fully in Part II, the limiting (negative) version of
retributive theory merely sets outer limits on punishment, defining a range of
permissible severity for any given case. In terms of the fairness arguments

14. Id. at 595-96 (discussing utilitarian means proportionality principle); see also infra
text accompanying notes 24-29 (discussing the parsimony principle).
15. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 29-33 (1993); Frase, Excessive
Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 590.
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summarized above, retributive limits defining the minimum acceptable penalty
reflect concerns about fairness to victims, law-abiding persons, and other
offenders; upper-retributive limits, defining the maximum allowable penalty,
reflect the widely shared sense that it is fundamentally unfair and an abuse of
governmental power to punish an offender more severely than he deserves.
Uniformity is another very important nonutilitarian sentencing principle;
similarly situated offenders should receive similar punishments. But uniformity
is not a self-sufficient criterion; as was noted at the outset, concepts of
uniformity and disparity always require reference to some other principle or
principles which render two offenders similarly situated. In recent years
retributive values have been the most common reference principle. This
combination of retributive and uniformity principles is often called the Theory
of Just Deserts; offenders of comparable blameworthiness (in terms of social
harm and offender culpability) should receive similar penalties, and offenders
differing in blameworthiness should be punished in proportion to their
respective degrees of blame.16
Like retribution, uniformity is based on concepts of fairness—fairness to
other offenders (who could justly complain if this defendant received a lighter
penalty for the same conduct), and fairness to the defendant (who could justly
complain if he were punished more severely than other equally blameworthy
offenders). Uniformity can be a positive sentencing purpose, defining an exact
quantum of appropriate punishment, or a limiting principle, defining a range of
allowable penalties designed to prevent gross disparities without seeking to
impose exact equality.
The civil and human rights of defendants provide another set of
nonutilitarian limiting principles. The requirement of humane treatment forbids
torture, dismemberment, and other brutal physical or psychological
punishments, without regard to whether some offenders might be thought to
deserve such penalties or whether the penalties could be deemed necessary and
effective to achieve crime control or other utilitarian purposes. Convicts also
retain First Amendment and other civil rights which may limit the form or
conditions of punishment.
C. Utilitarian Proportionality and Uniformity
Sentencing proportionality and uniformity are usually linked to theories of
retribution or just deserts, but they also have important utilitarian value.17
When penalties for different crimes are proportional to the harms caused or
threatened by those crimes, offenders have an incentive to stop at the lesser
crime. Such proportionality also matches punishment costs with crime-control

16. See generally VON HIRSCH, supra note 15.
17. See generally Robinson & Darley, supra note 12.
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benefits.18 In addition, more uniform sentencing permits more accurate
forecasts of future prison populations and other correctional resource needs.19
Denunciation and public respect are additional benefits of sentencing
proportionality. As the punishment theorist H.L.A. Hart noted, if “the relative
severity of penalties diverges sharply from this rough [proportionality] scale,
there is a risk of either confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing
the law into contempt.”20 In other words, disproportionate penalties undercut
the law’s desired norm-reinforcing messages and reduce public respect for the
criminal law and criminal justice systems. Such respect can help reduce crime.
Research has shown that people are more likely to obey the law if they perceive
the law and its processes to be fair.21 As discussed above, proportionality and
uniformity of sentencing are based on widely shared fairness concerns, so
highly disparate penalties are likely to reduce the public’s willingness to obey
the law and cooperate with law enforcement.
D. Conflicts Within and Across Punishment Principles
The sentencing principles summarized above are all valid and widely
recognized, but they often conflict with each other. In the example cited at the
outset of this Article (Case No. 1), uniformity and proportionality principles
require that two equally culpable offenders receive equally severe sanctions,
despite one’s lower risk of reoffending. However, it is difficult to find a
sanction that satisfies all relevant sentencing purposes. Sending both offenders
to prison uses scarce prison space for a low-risk offender, may make that
offender worse, and, if the crime is not serious, contradicts the desired normreinforcing message conveyed by punishment. Putting both on probation fails
to protect the public from the high-risk offender (at least without substantial
increases in probation resources) and, if the crime is serious, fails to provide
appropriate general deterrent and norm-reinforcing messages.
Sentencing purposes conflict in many other ways. The following are three
more examples:
Case No. 2. Efforts to promote victim or community satisfaction and
compensation may result in sanctions which, from a retributive and/or a crimecontrol and efficiency standpoint, are either too severe (if the victim or
community insist on more severity than other purposes require) or not severe
enough (if the victim or community are forgiving or want to keep the offender
out of prison in order to perform compensatory service or earn the money to

18. See Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 593.
19. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the important benefits of
accurate resource-impact assessments in state guidelines systems).
20. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 25 (1968).
21. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 31, 64-68 (1990).
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pay restitution).
Case No. 3. An offender’s mental illness or drug addiction may greatly
limit his capacity to obey the law, thus making him less blameworthy and less
deserving of severe punishment. But the same offender characteristics make the
offender very likely to reoffend, thus justifying a lengthy prison term. Mental
health or treatment programs could, in theory, reduce the need for punishment
severity in such cases while adequately assuring public safety, but, in the real
world, such programs are all too often absent or severely underfunded.
Case No. 4. Increased rates of imprisonment may heighten general
deterrent and denunciation effects, but some of the additional offenders sent to
prison will probably be made worse (i.e., more dangerous, less able to cope
with freedom) than they were before entering prison. In theory this conflict can
be resolved by balancing the positive and negative effects of increased rates of
imprisonment, but this approach requires substantial data collection and
calculation that courts are ill equipped to handle in day-to-day sentencing
practice.
How can these various conflicts be resolved by busy courts? The theory of
limiting retributivism, discussed below, has been widely adopted and offers the
best solution.
II. RECONCILING CONFLICTING PUNISHMENT PRINCIPLES: LIMITING
RETRIBUTIVISM
The most serious conflicts among punishment principles occur between
case-specific utilitarian purposes and just deserts principles. According to the
latter, all offenders should receive their particular deserts—no more and no
less. Such a system leaves very little room for consideration of other
punishment purposes, and no jurisdiction in the United States or elsewhere has
ever adopted such a one-dimensional approach. Instead, almost every system
has adopted some form of what Norval Morris called “limiting retributivism”
(also known as modified just deserts).22 Under this widely endorsed and
adopted model, the offender’s desert defines a range of morally justified
punishments, setting upper and lower limits on the severity of penalties that
may fairly be imposed on a given offender. These upper and lower limits also
promote the utilitarian benefits of uniformity and proportionality.23 Within the

22. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 161, 182-87, 196-200 (1982)
[hereinafter MORRIS, MADNESS]; cf. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE 9 (1980) (adopting modified just deserts approach). See generally Richard
S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83, 90-104 (Michael
Tonry ed., 2004) [hereinafter Frase, Limiting Retributivism] (discussing widespread support
for basic elements of limiting retributivism); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in
Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 365-78 (1997) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing
Principles] (summarizing Morris’s theory of punishment and Minnesota’s approach).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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range of deserved penalties, case-specific incapacitation, rehabilitation,
deterrence, and other sentencing goals may be pursued, but only to the extent
that they are needed in a given case. Sentences within the desert range should
be no more severe than necessary to achieve defined aims, a humane and
utilitarian principle of necessity and efficiency which Morris referred to as
“parsimony.”24
Morris argued that desert can only define a range of penalties because the
very concept of desert is inherently imprecise.25 In any given case there will be
widespread agreement that certain penalties are clearly undeserved (because
they are either excessively severe or excessively lenient). But there may be
little political or philosophical consensus on the offender’s precise deserts, even
relative to other offenders committing the same crime.
But if a range of morally permissible penalties exists, why not sentence all
offenders at the top of the range, or at least use that as the starting point in order
to maximize crime-control effects? Morris’s opposite presumption, in favor of
the least severe penalty in the range, is based on both moral and practical
grounds.26 The moral arguments are analogous to those that underlie the
requirement that guilt be established by elaborate trial procedures and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt: punishment intrudes on physical liberty and other
very important rights, and the crime-control benefits of punishment are
uncertain. Thus, the burden should be on the state to justify each additional
increment of punishment severity.
The practical arguments for preferring sentences less severe than the
offender’s maximum desert flow not only from efficiency concerns (less
severity is often adequate to achieve all utilitarian goals) but also from the
pervasive need to encourage and reward cooperation from those accused of
crime. Given the state’s limited resources and powers, there is a compelling
need to obtain guilty pleas, waivers of jury trial and other rights, and
cooperation in convicting other defendants. In addition, defendants placed on
probation or parole must be encouraged to obtain and hold employment,
support their dependents, make restitution, avoid risky places or behaviors, and
accept treatment and supervision. Incarcerated defendants sent to prison or jail
must have an incentive to cooperate with institutional rules and programs.
Sentences must also leave room for backup sanctions—subsequent tightening
of control (e.g., by revocation of probation or parole) if the defendant fails to
cooperate—even if that failure is not, in itself, very blameworthy. Thus, in
practice, modern systems of law enforcement and punishment always function
24. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59-62 (1974) [hereinafter
MORRIS, FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT]; Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at
595-97.
25. MORRIS, MADNESS, supra note 22, at 198; see also NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL
TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL
SENTENCING SYSTEM 84-89, 104-05 (1990).
26. MORRIS, FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, supra note 24, at 61.
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according to a limiting retributive model under which most offenders, in return
for their cooperation, receive less severe sanctions than the maximum they
deserve.
For all of these moral and practical reasons, limiting retributivism has been
widely endorsed by scholars, model code drafters, legislators, sentencing
commissions, judges, and practitioners.27 Desert-based limits on maximum
sanction severity have received particularly broad support.28 Morris’s concept
of parsimony—that sentences within the deserved range should be no more
severe than needed to achieve all relevant utilitarian purposes—has been
strongly promoted by utilitarian philosophers as far back as Beccaria and
Bentham, and finds support in the Model Penal Code (the original version and
recent proposed revisions), all three editions of the American Bar Association
sentencing standards, and many fields of American law.29
Some version of limiting retributivism has also been the basis for most
contemporary sentencing laws.30 Indeterminate systems (still the most common
sentencing regime) reflect a very loose version of this approach; most
American sentencing guidelines systems embody a more precise and structured
form of limiting retributivism.31 A range of allowable sanctions is provided for
each case. The limits of sanction severity (tops and bottoms of the ranges) are
scaled according to offense severity and prior conviction record, with the
former usually having greater weight. Unlike the Federal Guidelines, state
guidelines systems retain considerable sentencing flexibility, and mandatory
minimum sentences are less prevalent and severe than in the federal system.32
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in effect since 1980, represent a
good example of limiting retributivism in operation.33 The modified just

27. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 22, at 90-104; see also CONSTITUTION
PROJECT, PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN AND REFORM OF SENTENCING SYSTEMS (2005) (noting
that crime-control purposes should operate within upper and lower proportionality limits),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/si/Principles.doc (last visited Sept. 13, 2005) .
28. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 22, at 92-93 (noting the support of
influential writers such as H.L.A. Hart and the drafters of the Model Penal Code, recent
proposals to revise the Code, and the two most recent editions of the American Bar
Association’s sentencing standards).
29. Id. at 94-95; see also Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 595-627
(discussing many examples of principles akin to parsimony in United States constitutional
law and in foreign and international law).
30. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 22, at 95-104.
31. Id. at 97-104; Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 22, at 407-30 (discussing
the limiting retributive features of Minnesota’s guidelines); Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note
1 (arguing that the Federal Guidelines implicitly embody the modified just deserts model).
32. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1198-1201, 1208 (2005) [hereinafter
Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines]; see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in
Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED.
SENT’G. REP. 69, 69, 76 (1999).
33. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY (rev. Aug. 1, 2005), http://www
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deserts sentencing philosophy adopted in Minnesota sets desert-based upper
and lower limits on sanction severity, recognizes the principle of parsimony,
leaves substantial scope for the application of non-desert sentencing purposes,
retains substantial case-specific flexibility, and tailors overall sanction severity
levels to available resources.34 Minnesota’s guidelines have achieved a stable
and workable balance between the conflicting purposes and limitations of
punishment.
A. The Limits of the Criminal Law as an Instrument of Crime Control
For most offenses and offenders, the crime-control effects of punishment
probably are quite limited.35 One of the most important factors determining the
deterrent effect of sanctions is the probability of punishment.36 But the
detection rates for most crimes are very low, and the probability of an offender
receiving a custody sentence is often less than one out of every one hundred
crimes committed.37 Low detection, conviction, and incarceration rates also
severely limit the effectiveness of criminal sanctions designed to achieve
rehabilitation or incapacitation. Moreover, each of these crime-control
mechanisms relies on numerous additional assumptions which often do not
prove true.38
The crime-control effects are likely to be particularly limited for many
federal crimes. Although separate data on federal crimes are not available, there
is no reason to believe that crime-detection rates are higher for federal crimes
than for other crimes. Moreover, police and prosecutors are very selective in
deciding what to make a federal case.39 Federal criminal law often overlaps

.msgc.state.mn.us/Guidelines/guide05.DOC (last visited Sept. 13, 2005). See generally
Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 22.
34. Frase, Sentencing Principles, supra note 22, at 388-430. See generally Richard S.
Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & JUST. 131 (2005).
Although Minnesota’s guidelines retain substantial case-level flexibility, sentencing
practices are sufficiently uniform to permit the Minnesota Guidelines Commission to make
accurate forecasts of the impact of changes in guidelines or statutes on future prison
populations and other correctional resources. Such resource-impact assessments have
allowed Minnesota to set priorities in prison use and avoid prison overcrowding. Id. at 14647, 204-05. Several other guidelines states have taken a similar approach, but resourceimpact assessments have never played any significant role in the federal system. Frase, State
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1198, 1216-19.
35. For further discussion, Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and
Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2005) (in this Issue).
36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 57 (David Farrington et
al. eds., 2004) (showing U.S. custody rates per 1000 crimes committed for various crimes).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11. In contrast, early childhood intervention
and other crime-preventive measures outside the criminal justice system have been found to
be quite effective. See Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1219 n.138.
39. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision To File Federal Criminal Charges: A
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with state law, so federal law officers can defer to state authorities. Even where
federal criminal jurisdiction is exclusive (for example, in many areas of
regulatory crime and crime committed against the federal government),
criminal prosecution is usually reserved for aggravated or persistent
violations.40 In recent years, a large proportion of suspects prosecuted in
federal courts were charged with drug violations,41 but about ten times as many
drug offenders were prosecuted in state courts.42 Given the clandestine nature
of drug use and drug trafficking, it seems likely that detection rates are at least
as low for these offenses as for most other crimes. Furthermore, drug crimes
are very hard to deter, since they are often motivated by addiction, high profits
(maintained by supply-side enforcement), and/or lack of attractive lawful
activities. White-collar and regulatory offenders are more likely to be deterred,
even by selective enforcement and modest penalties; such offenders have many
lawful alternatives and much to lose from being convicted, regardless of the
penalty. But the highly selective use of criminal penalties in such cases raises
very serious uniformity problems. When offenders appear to have been unfairly
singled out, respect for the law and law enforcement suffers.43
B. Illustrative Cases
The four examples of conflicting sentencing purposes described above can
be used to illustrate how sentencing guidelines based on the limiting retributive
model can help provide resolution. The first step is to determine whether the
top and bottom of the recommended guidelines range need to be adjusted to
account for factors which increase or decrease the seriousness of the conviction
offense. Applying the parsimony principle, the sentencing judge then begins at

Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 252 tbl.1 (1980)
[hereinafter Frase, Decision To File] (finding that from 1974 to 1978, approximately 22% of
criminal matters were prosecuted). Recent published reports show higher federal prosecution
rates. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING 2002,
at 9 tbl.3 (2005) (noting that 73% of suspects investigated were prosecuted). However, these
data exclude matters on which attorneys spent less than one hour of time. Id. at 17. In earlier
years Justice Department data included all matters received from investigating agencies,
producing much lower prosecution rates. See Frase, Decision To File, supra (citing Justice
Department statistical reports); see also id. at 254, 321 (finding that in the Northern District
of Illinois, half of matters were immediately declined, and only 14% of these were declined
because no federal crime appeared to have been committed).
40. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 39, at 9 (finding a 62% declination
rate for regulatory crime). As discussed in note 39, supra, more complete data from earlier
years suggests that true declination rates are much higher than recent published rates.
41. Id. at 10 (noting 30,673 drug defendants in 2002, comprising 35% of defendants
prosecuted in federal courts).
42. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 2
(2004) (finding that an estimated 340,330 defendants were charged with drug crimes in state
courts).
43. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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the low end of the adjusted range and increases sentencing severity until all
applicable case-specific utilitarian sentencing purposes have been satisfied.
Case No. 1.44 In this example, two offenders are identical in everything but
the risk of reoffending. This case is easily resolved by the state guidelines
limiting retributive model. Within the adjusted range, offenders may receive
unequal punishments based on risk assessments. The lower and upper
boundaries limit unfairly lenient or severe sentences and satisfy utilitarian
(general deterrent and denunciation) needs for uniformity and proportionality.
Case No. 2.45 This example highlights a conflict between the needs of
victims and the community, on the one hand, and just desert values and/or
crime-control goals, on the other. Again, the upper and lower adjusted range
boundaries address uniformity and proportionality concerns. Within the range,
case-specific crime control and victim or community needs may all be
considered; whatever purpose calls for the greatest sanction will prevail unless
the legislature provides that a particular purpose should receive priority and
should trump the others.
Case No. 3. This example involved a high-risk offender with substantially
diminished capacity to obey the law due to mental illness or addiction. Fairness
to the offender, as well as the utilitarian advantages of uniformity and
proportionality, require a desert-based upper limit on allowable punishment
severity. If this limit appears inadequate to ensure public safety, mental health
or other noncriminal alternatives can be invoked; public safety imperatives,
combined with upper desert limits, give the legislature an incentive to provide
the necessary alternatives.
Case No. 4. This example posited a conflict between the need for increased
deterrence (for instance, because of a recent increase in frequency of the crime)
and the risk of damaging vulnerable offenders. The latter risk is lessened by the
upper range limits and by the court’s discretion within the range to give a
shorter prison or jail term (or, where authorized, a noncustodial sentence) to
offenders who appear particularly vulnerable.46
CONCLUSION
Many legitimate purposes and limitations apply to punishment decisions.
These purposes and limits require both discretion to tailor sentences to
particular offense and offender circumstances and substantial limitations on
44. This case is described supra in the Introduction of this Article and is further
discussed supra at the end of Part I.
45. Cases 2, 3, and 4 are described supra at the end of Part I.
46. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Minn. 1981) (approving
probation, jail, and treatment, in lieu of a presumptive twenty-three to twenty-five-month
prison term, where the defendant was very amenable to treatment on probation and his
immaturity would cause him to be easily victimized or led into crime if he were sent to
prison).
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that discretion. It is intolerable to allow three identical offenders to receive very
different sanction severity because one judge believes in community-based
treatment, one believes in proportionality limits, and one believes in using very
lengthy prison terms for deterrence. It is likewise intolerable to force judges to
impose identical sentences when different penalties are warranted. Sentencing
judges must have guided discretion, and they must be clear about which
purposes they are pursuing and with what priority. When defining the limits of
the sentencing judge’s discretion, legislatures, sentencing commissions, and
appellate courts must likewise be clear about purposes and priorities.
The principles of sentencing uniformity and proportionality reflect widely
shared fairness concerns and have great practical value. But these principles are
often in conflict with case-specific crime-control and restorative justice goals,
and the two latter purposes often conflict with each other. The theory of
limiting retributivism has broad support and provides a workable means of
harmonizing all of the important purposes and limitations of punishment. State
guidelines, such as those in Minnesota, provide good examples of successful
limiting retributive systems in operation.47
The Federal Guidelines are not based on limiting retributivism,48 but courts
or Congress could easily adapt the Guidelines to that model. Justice Breyer’s
remedy opinion in Booker directs courts to give particular emphasis to the
statement of sentencing purposes and other factors in section 3553(a) of the
Guidelines-enabling statute.49 That section clearly shows that Congress
preferred a hybrid theory of sentencing purposes, and it strongly suggests that
Congress had something like limiting retributivism in mind.
Section 3553(a) begins with a statement of the parsimony principle,50 and
paragraph 1 specifies that sentences should be based on both offense and
offender factors. Paragraph 2 then lists the principal sentencing purposes courts
should consider—paragraph 2A appears to endorse proportionality values,51
and paragraphs 2B to 2D recognize deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.52 Later paragraphs endorse sentencing uniformity and
restitution.53 As shown in this Article, the purposes listed in section 3553(a) are
47. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1211; Hofer & Allenbaugh,
supra note 1, at 24.
48. But see Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 1 (arguing that a form of limiting
retributivism is implicit in the Guidelines).
49. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-66 (2005).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (stating that the sentence should be sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this
subsection).
51. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (stating that courts shall consider the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense).
52. Id. § 3553(a), ¶¶ 2B-2D.
53. Paragraphs 3 through 5 of § 3553(a) direct courts to consider available penalties
and the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines and policy statements. Paragraphs 6 and 7 cite
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in conflict, but they can be harmonized under a limiting retributive model.
Indeed, the structure of section 3553(a) strongly implies this model: the
parsimony and proportionality principles are stated first, suggesting that they
set overall limits on the crime-control and other purposes which follow.
The limiting retributive model would bring much-needed coherence to
federal sentencing law. In the absence of further congressional action, federal
trial and appellate courts should interpret section 3553(a) consistently with this
model, using the Guidelines ranges, case-specific aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and other considerations54 to define proportionality limits
within which all other sentencing purposes operate, subject to the overall
requirement of parsimony. Of course, it would be preferable for Congress to
explicitly endorse the limiting retributive model. Section 3553(a) could easily
be rewritten to achieve this result, separately stating the three critical elements
of this model: outer proportionality limits, crime-control and other case-specific
considerations operating within those limits, and the principle of parsimony.55
Whether in federal or state court, sentencing must accommodate a variety
of punishment purposes and limitations. The theory of limiting retributivism
provides the best means to reconcile and give appropriate weight to all of these
purposes and limitations. This approach is the basis for most contemporary
sentencing laws, and its essential elements have been widely endorsed by
scholars, model code drafters, sentencing commissions, and practitioners. As
implemented in Minnesota and other guidelines states during the past twentyfive years, limiting retributivism has proven to be theoretically sound, wellbalanced, flexible, and practically viable.

the need to avoid unwarranted disparities and to provide restitution to victims.
54. Cf. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 13, at 651 (suggesting that the
Eighth Amendment and other constitutional proportionality principles could be adapted to
help federal courts define subconstitutional proportionality standards under § 3553(a)).
55. For a clear statement of these three elements, see MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004).
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